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20 Years After The Embodied Mind–Why is Cognitivism
Alive and Kicking?
Vincent C. Mu¨ller 1
Abstract. I want to suggest that the major influence of classical
arguments for embodiment like ”The Embodied Mind” by Varela,
Thomson & Rosch (1991) has been a changing of positions rather
than a refutation: Cognitivism has found ways to retreat and regroup
at positions that have better fortification, especially when it con-
cerns theses about artificial intelligence or artificial cognitive sys-
tems. For example: a) Agent-based cognitivism’ that understands
humans as taking in representations of the world, doing rule-based
processing and then acting on them (sense-plan-act) is often limited
to conscious decision processes; and b) Purely syntactic cognition is
compatible with embodiment, or supplemented by embodiment (e.g.
for ’grounding’). While the empirical thesis of embodied cognition
(’embodied cognitive science’) is true and the practical engineering
thesis (’morphological computation’, ’cheap design’) is of- ten true,
the conceptual thesis (’embodiment is necessary for cognition’) is
likely false - syntax is often enough for cognition, unless grounding
is really necessary. I conclude that it has become more sensible to
integrate embodiment with traditional approaches rather than ”fight
for embodiment” or ”against cognitivism”.
1 Cognitivism / Computationalism
The classic view of what is called ’cognitivism’ or, more accurately,
’computationalism’ is that syntactic processing over symbolic rep-
resentation is sufficient for intelligence, or perhaps even necessary
as well (Newell and Simon 1976). It follows that its reproduction
in computing machines will result in intelligence. On this classical
view, artificial intelligence and cognitive science are just two sides
of the same coin:
Artificial intelligence is not the study of computers, but of intel-
ligence in thought and action. Computers are its tools, because
its theories are expressed as computer programs that enable ma-
chines to do things that would require intelligence if done by
people. (Boden 1977: xi)
See also the classic Textbook: Artificial Intelligence: A Modern
Approach, by Stuart Russell and Peter Norvig where they say at the
outset ”We define AI as the study of agents that receive percepts from
the environment and perform actions.” (Russell and Norvig 2010:
viii). This expression has remained the same in the 1995, 2003 and
2010 editions. The only thing that was added in the latest edition is
”We place more emphasis on partially observable and nondetermin-
istic environments” (Russell and Norvig 2010: ix). Philosophically,
the main thesis of classical computationalism is that the human mind
1 Anatolia College/ACT, Greece & University of Oxford, UK
Web: www.sophia.de
is a functional computational mechanism operating over meaning-
ful representations. These representations are caused by information-
theoretical processes (Dretske 1981, 1995) or biological function in
a ”teleosemantics” (Macdonald and Papineau 2006; Millikan 2005).
This account is motivated by classical ’machine functionalism, go-
ing back to (Putnam 1960) and nicely characterized by Churchland:
”What unites them [the cognitive creatures] is that [...] they are all
computing the same, or some part of the same abstract <<sensory
input, prior state>, <motor output, subsequent state>>function.”
(Churchland 2005: 333). The set of functions that can be computed
in this fashion is delineated by the ’Church-Turing thesis’: All and
only the effectively computable functions can be computed by a Tur-
ing machine–i.e. step by step, fol- lowing an algorithm (definite and
finite rule). Machine functionalism together with a semantics make
the basics for classical cognitive science and AI.
1.1 Critique of the computationalist picture
Of course, classical computationalism has come under criticism from
many directions over the years, and some of that criticism has coin-
cided with a perceived lack of tech- nical progress in technical AI.
We will not aim to give any details here, but allow me to mention
a few mile- stones in that debate.
• Computation alone cannot generate intentional states of agents,
especially the state of ’meaning something’. This problem has
prominent forms in the ’Chinese room argument’ (Preston and
Bishop 2002; Searle 1980), the critique of ’encodingism’ (Bick-
hard 1993; Bickhard and Terveen 1996), and others.
• The ’frame problem’, one version of which seems to show that a
computational system cannot make decisions without representing
a very large number of facts (Dennett 1987; Pylyshyn 1987).
• Digital items like ’concepts’, ’words’ or ’phonemes’ play little or
no cognitive role, perhaps no representation plays much of a cog-
nitive role (or none) - anti-representationalism and sub-symbolic
cognition: (for example Bermu´dez 2003; Calvo Garzo´n 2006).
• Human cognition presupposes a human condition (Dreyfus 1992–
originally 1972; Wheeler 2005).
• Cognition is goal-dependent, thus a property only of certain bio-
logical creatures, that act–”enaction” or ”deep embodiment” (Di
Paolo et al. 2010; Froese and Di Paolo 2011).
• All and only the cognitive agents are embodied, cognition is
largely a function of a body, etc. (Clark 1997, 2003; a useful in-
troduction Hoffmann et al. 2010; Varela et al. 1991).
• ...
And from all this, one might conclude: ”Cognition is not compu-
tation!”
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1.2 Two notions of computing:
At this point, we shall not discuss whether all these arguments and
positions are any good. We will just try to clarify their impact, ac-
tual and argumentational. For these purposes, it might be useful to
remember that there are two basic notions of ’computation’ at stake
here, that are fundamentally different:
• Computing over meaningful representations (GOFAI, ’cogni-
tivism’) (e.g. Dretske 1995; Fodor, 1998).
• Computing over meaningless syntactic tokens.
The failure to make this distinction has some pretty nasty effects:
Mistake 1: [Type: Throw baby out with bathwater]
”Cognitivism is false, therefore cognition is not computation
and AI [via computers] won’t work.”
Mistake 2: [Optimistic extrapolation]
”I am not making Mistake 1, therefore cognition will still be
computation and AI [via computers] with work.”
2 Some Forms of Embodiment
Classical Embodiment
Allow me to expand on these forms of embodiment a little bit,
to see the arguments Useful surveys are (Calvo Garzn and Gomila
2008) and (Shapiro 2011, 2012). Classical Embodiment is largely a
negative thesis against Cognitivism and stresses the bodily experi-
ence:
By using the term embodied we mean to highlight two points:
first, that cognition depends upon the kinds of experience that
come from having a body with various sensorimotor capacities,
and second, that these individual sensorimotor capacities are
themselves embedded in a more encompassing biological,
psychological, and cultural context.
... sensory and motor processes, perception and action, are fun-
damentally inseparable in lived cognition. (Varela et al. 1991:
172f)
An evolutionary motivation (Wolpert)
”Why do we, and other animals, have brains? ... Now you may
reason that we have one to perceive the world or to think. That’s
completely wrong! ... We have a brain for one reason, and one reason
only, and that’s to produce adaptable and complex movements. There
is no other reason to have a brain.” (Wolpert 2011)
Embodiment as offloading (Pfeifer)
Starting with an intuition against ”Cartesian” centralized control,
we try to design robots with simple local control, exploiting body
dynamics and interaction with environment. This results in ”The
Emergence of Cognition from the Interaction of Brain, Body, and
Environment” (Pfeifer and Bongard 2007; Pfeifer et al. 2007). The
main illustrations are things like A) ’passive dynamic walkers’ i.e.
walking robots that need no energy, no motors, just walk down a
slightly downward sloping surface exploiting their body dynamics
in interaction with the properties of the environment (e.g. friction).
B) Insect walking. For example a cockroach has ca. 1 million neu-
rons, of which only 200 descending to body, so the walking move-
ments of each of the six legs is not centrally controlled [Roy E. Ritz-
mann], but rather the result of locally controlled movement. C) Trout
swimming–a trout can remain steady in a flowing stream by exploit-
ing the eddies and whirls of the stream and of its own body with
minimal or no energy use for sidewise movement (a dead trout can
retain this position for some time). D) A host of robots that show
complex behavior with little or no control, just due to their morphol-
ogy. The ’Crazy Bird’ robot with two constant motors but no sensors
showed various behaviors with minor modifications of motor speed
or leg friction1.
An animal can thus walk over a rough surface by exploiting the
elasticity of its body and reducing computation whereas ”a robot built
from stiff materials must apply complex control to adjust to uneven
ground and will therefore be very slow.” (Pfeifer and Bongard 2007:
97). This notion is (unfortunately) called ’morphological computa-
tion’ but is really a non-computational aspect of intelligence (Mller
and Hoffmann in preparation). One why this approach can only be
part of the story is the inherent tension between the stability of mor-
phology and the flexibility required for complex intelligent behavior.
Embodiment as enaction (O’Regan)
Perception in general and seeing in particular is a kind of action–
and this explains ’how it feels’ to us (O’Regan 2011). Since percep-
tion is a kind of action, it requires a body (not just passive sensors).
Cangelosi
There are a number of cases where embodiment influences cogni-
tive processing in more or less surprising ways–thus discrediting the
traditional ’Cartesian’ view of cognition as totally detached from a
body. One method in empirical research to bring out these influences
is ’priming’ and thus a detection of a bias. For example:
• Image recognition tasks: Subjects will press a button faster with
the right hand than with the left if primed with images that suggest
usage of the right hand–an object with ’affordance’ to grasp with
the right, e.g. a coffee cup with its handle on the right.
• If people are made to nod, they are much more likely to agree to a
given statement.
• Priming with ’elderly’ words (or slow animals) make people walk
more slowly.
• Priming with rude words make people more likely to interrupt a
conversation.
Embodiment as grounding (Steels)
Under the impression of arguments against intentional states (esp.
meaning) in computational systems, Harnad formulated the ’ground-
ing problem’: ”How can the meanings of the meaningless symbol
tokens, manipulated solely on the basis of their (arbitrary) shapes,
be grounded in anything but other meaningless symbols?” (Harnad
1990, 335). Researchers in robotics have worked on systems that
provide this ’grounding’ through interaction with the world, some-
times interacting with other robots and thus generating a ’conven-
tion’ for symbols that denote objects or classes in their environment.
Luc Steels has declared this problem ’solved’ (Steels 2008), though
tongue-in-cheek and I have my reservations (see below).
3 What was the argument, again?
It would not be totally surprising if at this point some confusion had
set in, for what was supposed to be the argument, and for which con-
clusion? A number of candidates come to mind:
• Hardware matters for robot performance (more than we thought)
1 http://www.eucognition.org/index.php?page=
behavioral-diversity---crazy-bird
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• Sensation is largely a kind of action (and thus needs a body)
• Large parts of the Brain deal with sensorimotor issues
• Representations need grounding
• Handicapped humans can’t think (or think differently) [???]
• Computers without bodies won’t be intelligent
Clearly, this needs some clearing up and I want to suggest that
there are three different kinds of theses in here, an empirical, a
practical and a conceptual one.
3.1 Empirical,practical,conceptual
The theses are the following, in a first approximation:
• An empirical thesis (about natural cognitive agents, esp. humans).
With the- se agents, it so happens that cognitive, affective and
bodily aspects are inter- twined and inseparable (e.g. Ziemke @
EUCog 2011).
• A practical engineering thesis (on how to best make artificial
agents with certain abilities); a thesis on ’cheap design’.
• A conceptual thesis (about the necessity of a body for cognition,
or a particular body for particular forms of cognition).
4 Re-grouping: Non-cognitivist, non-embodied
computing
To see how the opponents of these embodiment theses have re-
grouped it is necessary to pick up on our point above that computing
may be understood as a syntactic process (in fact, I think it must be
understood in that way). A basic point is that computing as far as it is
well understood is centrally digital computing, i.e. it operates on dis-
crete states that are tokens of a type (e.g. the type ’0’). The operations
on these tokens are algorithmic, i.e. precisely defined step-by- step
and ’effective’ (leading to a result). This stands in a certain tension
to classical computationalism–which Varela et al. call ’cognitivism’,
putting an emphasis on its notion of ’central processing’ rather than
on the form of this processing, namely computing.
4.1 Syntactical Computationalism
In order to motivate that there can be another form of computation-
alism, we need to explain a few things on the notion of computation.
Levels of description
A given computer can be described on three levels of description,
and properties that it has on one level, it will typically not have on
another. The levels are a) physical, in terms of its realization in a
particular hardware with its physical properties; b) syntactic, in terms
of its digital properties that can be described formally, and c) in terms
of semantics, what the digital tokens represent, if anything.
Computational sufficiency
• At some functional level (perhaps several), the brain operates as a
digital computer (syntactically, not over representations). This is
sufficient to generate cognition.
• Computational sufficiency thesis (CST): ”... the right kind of com-
putational structure suffices for the possession of a mind, and for
the possession of a wide variety of mental properties.” (Chalmers
1994, 2012; Shagrir 2012a, 2012b)
Computational universality
• Church-Turing Principle ”Every finitely realizable physical sys-
tem can be perfectly simulated by a universal model computing
machine operating by finite means” (Deutsch 1985: 99)
• ”... everything that the laws of physics require a physical object
to do can, in principle, be emulated in arbitrarily fine detail by
some program on a general-purpose computer, provided it is given
enough time and memory.” [the problem is how the brain gener-
ates new explanations] (Deutsch 2012)
Multiple realizability
Strictly the same computation can be realized on different hard-
ware (on several lev- els) and the same hardware can realize different
computations if interpreted different- ly (on several levels). Here is
an example:
We have a logic gate with two inputs, one output. The output is
of 5 V if both in- puts are 5 V, otherwise 0 V (based on Sprevak
2010). This computes AND: output of 5 V (’true’) iff both inputs
are 5 V (’true’). This also computes OR: output of 0 V (’true’) iff at
least one of the inputs is 0 V (’true’). Which function is computed
de- pends on how this system is used, which interpretation of the
voltages is preferred. So this is a many-to-many relation: strictly the
same computation (e.g. OR) can be realized on different hardware,
and the same hardware can realize more than one computation. This
suggests the multiple realizability thesis:
If a system is not multiply realizable, then it is not computational.
4.2 Example I: Brain functionalism
One growing area where syntactic computationalism is used is the
representation of brain function in purely computational terms. Here
is a classical starting point from Christoph Koch’s Biophysics of
Computation: ”The brain computes! This is accepted as a truism by
the majority of neuroscientists engaged in discovering the principles
employed in the design and operation of the nervous system.” (Koch
1999: 1) And what does that mean? It is thought of a sequence of
incoming data–encoding–computational operations–control of out-
put and a very liberal notion of computing is at play here. Something
”can be thought of as computation as long as it can be mapped on one
or more mathematical operations that perform some useful function”
... if it is ”actually being exploited by the organism” (Koch 1999: 2).
His example is that a marble running down a hill computes the ”local
minimum of a two-dimensional energy function”.
If this is the way to see things, then perhaps we could scan the
brain and emulate in different hardware? Given computational suffi-
ciency (due to computational universality or for further reasons) and
multiple realizability, this should be possible!
We do know the 320 neurons of the notorious C. Elegans ne-
matode but as Koch says ”We have no idea what the 302 neu-
rons are doing!” (Ch. Koch, talk 2011). Ef- forts are now under
way by David Dalyrumple to generate a full simulation of this or-
ganism (http://nemaload.davidad.org/), which achieves
very complex behavior with these neurons–including finding food,
reproduction and some learning.
For humans, the task would be just a tiny bit more complicated,
with ca. 64 billion neurons (plus glia cells, etc.), ca. 200 cell types,
ca. 7000 connections each via a long dendric tree that can span across
the entire brain (Deca 2012). But efforts to detect the ’human con-
nectome’ of these connections are now under way and the EU has
just awarded one of the two huge FET Flagship projects (10 years,
1 billion) to a computational study of the whole human brain in the
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’Human Brain Project’. Several authors expect that whole-brain em-
ulation might be the fastest way to high-level AI because it seems
to require essentially scientific ’grind’ on a large scale, but not deep
’insight’ into the complexities of human cognition (Kurzweil 2012;
Sandberg 2013).
4.3 Example II: ’artificial general intelligence’
Some AI researchers see the time has come to return from techni-
cal and specialized AI to the original aim of a universal intelligence,
not unlike the human one, an ’artificial general intelligence’ (AGI).
If one starts on the assumption that an intelligent agent is one that
successfully pursues their goals in a given environment by select-
ing the right action, then a more intelligent one can do this in more
environments–this kind of consideration provides a general measure
of intelligence (Legg and Hutter 2007). In this vein, one can work
towards AGI with machine-learning techniques that essentially opti-
mize output, given certain sets of input (normally with probabilistic
techniques). Despite the fact that the original model has some unre-
alistic assumptions (agent has infinite computing power, is not part
of environment, is immortal), there are substantial projects underway
that create such agents (like AIXI) (Hutter 2012; Visser et al. 2006).
Note: Problems of ’Action-Selection’ Allow me to note that this ap-
parently innocuous line of research makes one particular assump-
tion that seems problematic from an embodied point of view, namely
that intelligent agents solve a problem of ’action selection’, of ’what
should I do next?’ This is the outcome of a ”Model-Plan-Act” view
of action (with ”Intention-Belief-Desire” psychology), which is du-
bious, even for humans.
In fact, life and cognition are continuous; there is no ’next step’.
What counts as ”next action” depends on the granularity of descrip-
tion (e.g. raise foot vs. go to supermarket), so there is no ”set of
possible actions” (life is not like chess). In this ac- count, it must be
decided what is relevant information and which beliefs must change
with action–the ’frame problem’ is coming back to us. As an illus-
tration, note that many intelligent agents do not ’select actions’ at
all: This seems apparent in lower- level animals (a slug or even a
cockroach), in certain non-classical designs for AI and in coupled
embodied systems; e.g. a passive dynamic walker.
Syntactic approaches Of course, there are more important models
along these lines, in particular dynamic systems theory (e.g. Johnson
et al. 2008; Spencer et al. 2009) or the view of the brain as probabilis-
tic prediction machine (Clark forthcoming 2012). The point here was
just to indicate that this kind of position exists and that it is untouched
by several of the classical ’embodiment’ arguments–in fact the latter
two are advanced as endorsing embodiment.
4.4 Grounding (’Weak embodiment’)
There is one other way to re-group in the face of embodiment but
maintain a classical research program: admit that the symbols in a
computer are initially meaningless, but try to ground these symbols
through interaction with the world. What the precise shape of the
’grounding problem’ is and whether it has been solved is a long story
(Mu¨ller 2011, forthcoming), but I suggest to make the following dis-
tinction between two grounding problems:
The easy problem of symbol grounding
”How can we explain and re-produce the behavioral ability and
function of meaning [and other intentional phenomena] in artificial
computational agents?” This is an empirical question and a practi-
cal question, where solutions to the one are definitely useful for the
other. Often practical proposals in ’epigenetic robotics’ have been
said to shed light on the mechanism in humans (Cangelosi and Riga
2006). As we mentioned above, some argue that the problem has
been solved and the suitably constructed computational mechanism
acquires a semantic network in interaction with other such mecha-
nisms(Steels 2008), but this is hardly universally accepted (Cangelosi
2009).
Proponents of ”deep embodiment” would have to say that
computational-robotic solutions are bound to fail. None of these sys-
tems have any intentional states, desires or goals because they don’t
have a life, in particular a precarious one. Thus, they do not have the
right functional architecture, the right causal connections for symbol
grounding (Di Paolo 2010).
The hard problem of symbol grounding
Even if this problem is solved, there might be a harder problem,
namely ”How does physics give rise to meaning and other intentional
properties?” To solve this would require to reproduce not only behav-
ioral ability and function but also the right inner mechanism in order
to ”Get the system to mean what it says”. In humans, the experience
of understanding is an elementary part of what we call ’understand-
ing’, which is why the Chinese Room Argument turns on the pres-
ence or absence of this experience. (This relies roughly on a Grice’s
analysis, which Searle shares, namely: To mean what I say is to try
to get someone else to recognize my intentions of meaning some-
thing–which might be different from what my words mean (Grice
1957).) It should be obvious that the hard problem directly involves
conscious experience, i.e. it involves solving Chalmers’ ’hard prob-
lem’ of consciousness (Chalmers 1996). This problem is untouched
by evolutionary robotics.
Given this situation, my view is that we should return to the ’easy
problem’: ”How can we explain and re-produce the behavioral abil-
ity and function of meaning [and other intentional phenomena] in
artificial [mainly] computational agents?” This is not a philosophical
problem but one that can be solved with cognitive science. If symbol
grounding is necessary for cognition at some ’level’, this problem
must be solved in order to achieve artificial cognition at that ’level’.
5 Is Cognition like adding numbers or like growing
apples?
5.1 Causal powers
Given multiple realizability, would reproducing the computation in
a cognitive sys- tem reproduce the behavior? I don’t think so. The
reason is that features on the physi- cal and semantic levels of de-
scription are not necessarily reproduced–but these are crucial for the
causal powers, i.e. the behavior.
Given that hardware-dependent features are not computational
(and thus ”morphological computation” is not computation) we can-
not expect such features to be identical in different realizations. For
example, if one realization produces a red light, another might pro-
duce a barrier down. To use a more general example: A computa-
tional model of an apple tree does not produce apples (but only ap-
ples* in the model).
Given that semantics-dependent features are not computational
(”GOFAI com- putation” is not computation in my terminology), we
cannot guarantee that these will be identical in different realizations
either. If one realization produces a YES, another might produce a
NO, depending on the interpretation of the output. (Note that this is
not the same point as the one above concerning AND and OR, which
concerned syntax.)
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5.2 Purely syntactic structure may be just what is
needed for cognition...
As we illustrated above, there is some hope to think that purely syn-
tactic structures might be just what is needed for a successful account
of cognition that allows for successful artificial cognitive systems.
Perhaps the syntactic properties that are maintained across multiple
realizations are sufficient? Perhaps any realization of 2 + 2 = 4 adds 2
+ 2? Or is this the old fallacy where ”=” means something to me, and
I thus assume that it means something to the computing machine? In
any case, the challenges for artificial cognitive systems will remain
gigantic, even if embodiment is not as much a game-changer as some
have thought (Gomila and Mller 2012).
Also, we need to remember Mistake 2: (Optimistic extrapolation)
- ”I am not making Mistake 1 [no computationalism, thus no com-
puting], therefore cognition might still be computation and AI via
computers will work”. This is not a given, this needs to be estab-
lished.
6 Conclusion
As far as the three theses are concerned, if we remember that they
are logically indepenent–and this is usually forgotten–, then we can
say:
• The empirical thesis is true
• The practical engineering thesis is true
• The conceptual thesis is likely false (i.e. syntax is often enough)
... unless it should turn out that symbol grounding (easy or hard)
is necessary, and that is not implied by the truth of the empirical
thesis above.
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